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If we take an active role in managing the planet, we will replace mystery and 
beauty with lousy engineering.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In November 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that China’s Weather 
Modification Office started seeding clouds with silver iodide in an effort to 
counteract a lingering drought in Beijing.2 Even though China intended this 
                                                        
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2015, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Neva-
da, Las Vegas. Thank you to Dr. Shelley L. Hurt of California Polytechnic State University, 
San Luis Obispo for mentoring me and helping me develop the foundation for this note dur-
ing my time at Cal Poly. 
1  JEFF GOODELL, HOW TO COOL THE PLANET: GEOENGINEERING AND THE AUDACIOUS QUEST 
TO FIX EARTH’S CLIMATE 218 (2010). 
2  Jason Dean, Blizzard Renews Storm over China Making Snow, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 
2009, at A12; Clay Dillow, China’s Weather Manipulation Brings Crippling Snowstorm  
to Beijing, POPULAR SCI. (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.popsci.com/science/article 
/2009-11/chinas-weather-manipulation-brings-crippling-snowstorm-beijing (“The Chinese 
government employs the controversial practice of cloud seeding in an attempt to force pre-
cipitation in and around Beijing.”).  
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procedure to produce local rain, it instead accidentally produced snowfall, lead-
ing to the biggest blizzard in China in over five decades.3 This incidental, man-
made blizzard caused over $650 million worth of damage and forty deaths.4 
Although unintended, this calamity stirred a controversial uproar over whether 
state actors have the right to modify the weather or manipulate the climate.5 
The United Nations—along with many scholars opposed to environmental 
modification techniques—argued that the weather belongs to everyone, and be-
cause the environmental consequences can potentially be transnational, state 
actors should not tamper with it.6 Further, opponents of environmental modifi-
cation techniques argue that this science is underdeveloped and stress the po-
tential harm to our ecosystems if a drastic modification of the environment oc-
curs.7 
Although China has practiced only small-scale and temporary weather 
modification techniques, such as cloud seeding, its accidental blizzard exempli-
fies the exact problems that the international scientific community is currently 
debating about geoengineering. Geoengineering is commonly defined as the 
“deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate system, in order to 
moderate global warming.”8 Instead of regional weather modification tech-
niques—like cloud seeding in order to produce local rain—geoengineering’s 
effects go beyond state territories, and may encompass whole continents, or 
even hemispheres. Stated simply, geoengineering is a form of weather modifi-
cation, but on a global or hemispheric scale. The two terms—weather modifica-
tion and geoengineering—can seem interchangeable at times because both sci-
ences involve environmental modification techniques and can cause devastating 
results. Nevertheless, this note distinguishes between the two sciences to 
                                                        
3  Dean, supra note 2. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. (“ ‘The weather belongs to everyone, not just to the Department of Artificial Interfer-
ence with the Weather.’ ”) (quoting a blogger from Shou.com); see Suvi Huttunen & Mikael 
Hildén, Framing the Controversial: Geoengineering in Academic Literature, 36 SCI. COMM. 
3, 4 (2013) (“Geoengineering is novel and highly controversial.”); Scientists ‘Cause’ Beijing 
Snow, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2009 2:59 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific 
/8337337.stm (stating that scientists are skeptical of the effectiveness of cloud seeding). 
6  See generally Climate & Geoengineering, ETC GRP., http://www.etcgroup.org/issues 
/climate-geoengineering (last visited May 27, 2015). Some of the main opponents of envi-
ronmental modification techniques include the ETC group, which “calls for a ban” on ge-
oengineering because it is a false solution to climate change. Id. 
7  WSF 2013: Geoengineering: Resisting Climate Manipulation, ETC GRP. (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://www.etcgroup.org/content/wsf-2013-geoengineering-resisting-climate-manipulation. 
8  ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY, 
at ix (2009), available at http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content 
/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, IPCC EXPERT MEETING ON GEOENGINEERING, MEETING REPORT 2 (Ottmar Edenho-
fer et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter IPCC MEETING REPORT], available at http://www 
.ipcc-wg3.de/publications/supporting-material-1/EM-GeoE-Meeting-Report-final.pdf (find-
ing that the term “geoengineering” encompasses a “broad, and ill-defined, variety of con-
cepts for intentionally modifying the Earth’s climate at the large scale”). 
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demonstrate geoengineering’s potential for even greater disaster than weather 
modification.9  
As demonstrated by the documentary Owning the Weather, many states, 
private corporations, and even individuals increasingly use weather modifica-
tion techniques to combat global warming, but weather modification is just a 
limited, temporary fix.10 Although China’s weather modification techniques are 
not as large-scale as geoengineering, the accidental Beijing disaster provides a 
glimpse of the catastrophes geoengineering could cause before legal regulatory 
mechanisms are set in place.  
This issue of legal accountability for the potentially devastating effects of 
geoengineering is an important matter of debate for the international scientific 
community. For example, what would have happened if China’s man-made 
blizzard had crossed into a neighboring country, killing civilians and causing 
millions of dollars in damage? Would it be considered an act of war? Would 
China be accountable for the destruction? Although it would have been logical 
to address these issues before states began practicing environmental modifica-
tion techniques,11 such discussion has not taken place.12 International law has 
yet to catch up with this developing science. The Convention on the Prohibition 
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques, also known as ENMOD,13 is the only international legal mechanism 
dealing with weather modification. Unfortunately, ENMOD is outdated in its 
failure to regulate peaceful environmental modification techniques and to hold 
state actors accountable for geoengineered weather.14 With no international le-
gal agreement,15 state actors can perform this underdeveloped science, putting 
citizens’ lives at risk without the fear of liability.  
                                                        
9  See infra note 11; see also IPCC MEETING REPORT, supra note 8 (“Geoengineering is dif-
ferent from weather modification . . . but the boundary can be fuzzy.”). 
10  OWNING THE WEATHER (4th Row Films 2009). 
11  For purposes of this note, I use the term “environmental modification techniques” to en-
compass both geoengineering and weather modification. Although weather modification is 
small-scale compared to geoengineering, issues of accountability still must be addressed for 
both sciences. 
12  See Huttunen & Hildén, supra note 5, at 10 tbl.2 (“Geoengineering is essentially a gov-
ernance issue, where the governance problems should be solved as soon as possible, before 
the technology is applicable.”). 
13  Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 
151 [hereinafter ENMOD]. 
14  See generally Bidisha Banerjee, ENMOD Squad: Could an Obscure Treaty Protect De-
veloping Countries from Geoengineering Gone Wrong?, SLATE (Sept. 23, 2010, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2010/09/enmod_squad.html (finding 
that ENMOD would not cover geoengineering because of its peaceful purposes, “unless 
someone could prove hostile intent”). 
15  See IPCC MEETING REPORT, supra note 8, at 34 (“To date there has been little compre-
hensive assessment of the international regulation of geoengineering. Indeed, absent from 
the current legal landscape is a single treaty or institution addressing all aspects of geoengi-
neering; rather, the regulatory picture is a diverse and fragmented one both at the interna-
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Something must be done to eliminate the current lack of international law 
to govern this potentially dangerous field of scientific study and practice.16 Ge-
oengineering is no longer science fiction; it is being researched and developed 
now, while weather modification is already a common practice in the United 
States.17 Therefore, it is essential that international law catch up to the state-of-
the-art technological developments of today before a geoengineered catastrophe 
occurs that, in comparison, makes the Beijing blizzard look like a fun snow 
day. Without any sufficient legal mechanisms or precedents specific to envi-
ronmental modification techniques, there is no  consensus on the issue of liabil-
ity resulting from geoengineered weather. Consequently, this note asks: how 
can international law provide sufficient legal accountability in case of a cata-
strophic accident from geoengineering? 
As this note shows through congressional hearings, newspaper articles, and 
international agreements, geoengineering and weather modification have been 
lingering matters in international law for several decades and will continue to 
be reviewed, researched, and developed in the years to come. This note exam-
ines how international law can provide legal accountability for geoengineering 
in the event of a catastrophic accident. First, Part I describes commonly pro-
posed geoengineering techniques, coupled with the arguments for and against 
geoengineering. Second, Part II evaluates four case studies—including 
ENMOD—regarding relevant legal mechanisms to provide a legal precedent in 
international disputes, accountability, regulation, and enforcement. Finally, Part 
III interprets the evidence to assess the possible implications of international 
law on geoengineering.  
I. GEOENGINEERING TECHNIQUES 
To better recognize the catastrophic potential that geoengineering may 
have on the planet, it is imperative to understand the techniques used in its 
practice. However, before showcasing different geoengineering techniques and 
the scientific community’s acceptance—or rejection—of these techniques, this 
                                                                                                                                
tional and national levels.”); see also KELSI BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41371, GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 39 
(2013) (“[I]n the United States, there is limited federal involvement in, or oversight of, ge-
oengineering.”). 
16  See Huttunen & Hildén, supra note 5, at 9 (“[T]he mere existence of geoengineering op-
tions needs regulation, irrespective of its actual effects or effectiveness.”). 
17  OWNING THE WEATHER, supra note 10. According to the documentary, there are more 
than fifty active weather modification programs in the United States alone. Id. Scientists are 
already developing one type of geoengineering—the use of sulfate aerosols. Jonathan Ben-
son, Scientist Terrified of Geoengineering Technology Being Developed under  
Guise of Halting Global Warming, NAT. NEWS (Dec. 30, 2014), http:// 
www.naturalnews.com/048147_geoengineering_global_warming_chemtrails.html. (stating 
that Dr. Matthew Watson of Bristol University is “working on a $2.8 million [sulfate aero-
sol] project”). For a discussion of sulfate aerosols, see infra Part I(B). 
1064 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1060 
note briefly discusses the practices of weather modification in order to substan-
tiate the distinction between the two sciences.  
A. Weather Modification and the Rise of Geoengineering 
Weather modification techniques are regional and temporary modifications 
on a small-scale. Cloud seeding is a very common form of weather modifica-
tion.18 Cloud seeding—as used in the Beijing blizzard tragedy—is the process 
of spreading dry ice or silver iodide in the upper parts of clouds to induce rain 
or snowfall; this can be done by machine, plane, or even rockets to disperse the 
dry ice, or more commonly, the silver iodide.19 The silver iodide dispersed into 
the clouds clings to water molecules making the water molecules heavier.20 
Consequently, these heavier water molecules will fall, turning into rain or 
snow.21 This same technique was used in an attempt to weaken the wrath of 
Hurricane Debbie in August of 1969.22 Although this experiment—called Pro-
ject Stormfury—was not successful, it was a forerunner to modern geoengi-
neering techniques.23 
Contrary to the regional, temporary, and small-scale effects of weather 
modification, geoengineering is the large-scale manipulation of the Earth’s cli-
mate to counteract the effects of global warming.24 Geoengineering is a hot top-
ic because of the controversial issue of global warming, which estimates that 
Earth’s temperature will “warm by 3 to 7 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the 
century and forecast[s] a future of melting glaciers, rising seas, epic droughts, 
disease, and famine.”25 However, those forecasts are already out-of-date.26 
Earth’s temperature is actually rising faster than predicted, rendering the cli-
mate impact much more severe.27 Instead of an increase of only three to seven 
degrees, scientists now predict that the United States’ temperature could warm 
by as much as “15 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century.”28 Conse-
                                                        
18  See Virginia Simms, Comment, Making the Rain: Cloud Seeding, the Imminent Freshwa-
ter Crisis, and International Law, 44 INT’L LAW. 915, 916 (2010) (finding that over twenty-
seven countries engage in cloud seeding). 
19  Id. at 919. 
20  Id. at 918. 
21  Id. at 919. 
22  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 209; Jack Williams, Cloud Seeding Experiment Almost  
Snarled Hurricane Camille Forecast, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2013), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/08/27/cloud-seeding-ex 
periment-almost-snarled-hurricane-camille-forecast/. 
23  See ELI KINTISCH, HACK THE PLANET: SCIENCE’S BEST HOPE—OR WORST NIGHTMARE—
FOR AVERTING CLIMATE CATASTROPHE 87 (2010). 
24  See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 8. 
25  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 8 (referencing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s Report). 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. (indicating that the temperature increase may cause the sea levels to rise by as much as 
nine feet). 
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quently, “the public debate [has shifted] from how to stop global warming to 
how we can live with it.”29 Hence, the idea of geoengineering became a possi-
ble solution to the global warming problem. 
B. Geoengineering 
Geoengineering proposals typically fall into two categories: carbon dioxide 
removal and solar radiation management.30 Carbon dioxide removal, as its 
name implies, is the practice of removing carbon dioxide (“CO2”) from the at-
mosphere.31 Essentially, geoengineers want to remove CO2 because it heats the 
planet.32 When sunlight hits Earth, Earth reflects the heat energy from the sun-
light back into space.33 CO2, however, absorbs the heat energy and then rere-
leases some of it back into the atmosphere.34 Hence, CO2 in the atmosphere 
heats up the planet, and the removal of CO2 will cool the Earth’s tempera-
tures.35  
CO2 removal is an attractive option because of the high costs and politics 
involved with requiring large CO2 emitters, such as coal plants, to filter their 
CO2. Without having to use potentially dangerous geoengineering techniques, 
there are already “basic ways in which engineers could alter existing coal plants 
to grab their carbon dioxide.”36 One of the main non-geoengineering techniques 
for reducing CO2 is for coal plants to replace their air supply with pure oxygen 
in the boiler.37 Although this technique makes the CO2 easier to “grab,” it re-
quires a large amount of energy and could cut “the efficiency of the coal plant 
by 36 percent.”38 Alternatively, if coal plants added a CO2 filter to their ex-
haust, it could be very effective.39 However, CO2 filters are expensive, with an 
estimation of a fifty to seventy dollar-per-ton increase of CO2 that is filtered.
40 
Although some countries may have the political willingness to adopt such an 
expensive program, the largest CO2 emitters, such as China, the United States, 
                                                        
29  Id. at 14. 
30  BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 2. For more information regarding geoengi-
neering techniques, see IPCC, supra note 8; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 8, at 1. 
31  BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 2. 
32  How Does Carbon Dioxide Cause Global Warming, LANSING ST. J. (Aug. 31, 1994), 
http://www.pa.msu.edu/sciencet/ask_st/083194.html. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 10. 
36  KINTISCH, supra note 23, at 110. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. (citing an MIT study that estimated the costs of adding filters to coal plants); see Da-
vid Biello, Can Captured Carbon Save Coal-Fired Power?, SCI. AM. (May 17, 2009), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-captured-carbon-save/ (stating that the use of 
a $100 million carbon capture and sequestration boiler at a power plant produces nine metric 
tons of CO2 per hour, but recognizing that CO2 can be compressed into liquid form and sold 
to other companies, such as carbonated beverage makers like Coca-Cola). 
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and India, would be unlikely to require such pricy business practices to save the 
environment.41 Consequently, geoengineering techniques become a viable op-
tion when large, polluting companies are unwilling to foot the bill themselves. 
Even if large CO2 emitters filtered their CO2, carbon dioxide removal may 
still be necessary to cool the planet. Although carbon dioxide removal has not 
been scientifically proven as safe and effective, it is proposed as an emergency 
relief measure to prevent abrupt and severe climate change. Though the thought 
of going green and reducing CO2 to save the planet is appealing, “[e]ven if we 
cut CO2 pollution to zero tomorrow, the amount of CO2 we have already 
pumped into the atmosphere will ensure that the climate will remain warm for 
centuries.”42 In fact, CO2 can remain in the atmosphere for up to 100,000 
years.43 Thus, carbon dioxide removal has gained some popularity as a pro-
posed application of geoengineering. 
The other main geoengineering experiment—solar radiation manage-
ment—is also a widely controversial subject. During the second of three con-
gressional hearings on geoengineering in the House of Representatives’ Com-
mittee on Science and Technology in February of 2010, expert witness Dr. 
Philip Rasch defined solar radiation management as the process of “managing 
the amount of sunlight reaching the Earth’s surface.”44 The purpose of solar ra-
diation management is to reduce some of the global warming that is expected 
from the increasing amount of greenhouse gas concentrations.45 However, solar 
radiation management will not be able to fix other problems related to the in-
creasing amount of CO2, such as the heightened acidity of the ocean, endanger-
ing marine life.46 
One particularly contentious geoengineering technique, which would fall 
under the category of solar radiation management, is the use of stratospheric 
sulfate aerosols. This method is based on the logic that when a volcano erupts, 
it naturally cools down the earth because of the injection of sulfur dioxide into 
the stratosphere.47 The man-made replicas of this natural phenomenon are 
called sulfate aerosols, which “act like small reflectors that scatter sunlight.”48 
Some of the sunlight hitting the aerosol drops gets scattered down toward Earth 
                                                        
41  KINTISCH, supra note 23, at 110. “ ‘CCS is advancing slowly, due to high costs and lack 
of political and financial commitment.’ ” ‘Clean Coal’ Technologies, Carbon Capture & Se-
questration, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Energy-and-Envi 
ronment/-Clean-Coal--Technologies/ (last updated Feb. 2015) (quoting the International En-
ergy Association). 
42  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 9. 
43  Id. 
44  Geoengineering IIe: The Scientific Basis and Engineering Challenges: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Dr. Philip Rasch, Scien-
tist, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory). 
45  BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 15, at 15. 
46  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 17. 
47  Geoengineering IIe, supra note 44, at 5. 
48  Id. 
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and some gets reflected back out of our atmosphere.49 Consequently, Earth 
cools down.50 “[S]cientists [have] estimated that geoengineering the upper at-
mosphere with this particular technique could cool Earth by as much as 4 °F in 
a few years.”51 Scientists have also proposed using the same method to adjust 
climates to taste, whereby everyone could enjoy the same Mediterranean cli-
mate.52 However, this lavish proposal was quickly abandoned after realizing 
that not all food supplies grow properly in a Mediterranean climate.53 
C. Controversy in the Scientific Community 
Although these proposed geoengineering strategies might theoretically help 
counteract global warming, many respected, mainstream scientists have ex-
pressed doubt over the safety and effectiveness of geoengineering.54 For exam-
ple, Michael Oppenheimer, a climate scientist at Princeton, stated: “ ‘The fact 
that we’re even talking about it is a sign of desperation.’ ”55 Further, John 
Holdren, Chief Science Advisor to President Barack Obama, opined: “ ‘The ge-
oengineering approaches considered so far appear to be afflicted with some 
combination of high costs, low leverage, and a high likelihood of serious side 
effects.’ ”56 
In general, scientists’ doubts about geoengineering can be summed up in 
three main arguments.57 First, many experts believe that “we are messing with a 
system we don’t understand.”58 Earth’s climate is much more complex than we 
think. Scientists may understand the theories behind geoengineering, but the 
consequences are not always foreseeable. A prime example is the Beijing bliz-
zard.59 Chinese scientists may have understood the theory of cloud seeding; yet, 
they did not expect to create an uncontrollable blizzard that killed over forty 
people and caused more than $650 million of damage.60 Moreover, the Beijing 
blizzard was a simple case of cloud seeding—a localized, small-scale weather 
modification technique. If scientists cannot fully understand cloud seeding, 
                                                        
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
51  KINTISCH, supra note 23, at 7. 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 13. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 18. 
58  Id.; Climate Change FAQ, SCRIPPS INST. OF OCEANOGRAPHY, http://aquarium.ucsd.edu 
/climate/Climate_Change_FAQ/ (last visited May 27, 2015) (“[W]e don’t yet fully under-
stand the behavior of Earth’s complex climate system.”). 
59  Dean, supra note 2. But see GOODELL, supra note 1, at 41 (“The fact that even the best 
models can’t accurately predict next week’s weather is evidence of just how dynamic the 
system is. . . . ‘Predicting weather and predicting climate are two different things. A system 
can be quite chaotic on a local or regional level, while much steadier on a global scale.’ ”). 
60  Dean, supra note 2. 
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how can we have the confidence to let them manipulate the climate of an entire 
hemisphere, with the potential to cause catastrophic results that span not just 
countries, but continents? 
Second, the mere fact of discussing geoengineering “distracts us from the 
urgent job of cutting greenhouse gas pollution.”61 The sad reality is that the 
world—particularly the United States—is having trouble going green.62 In fact, 
CO2 emissions in the United States for 2013 actually increased due to higher 
costs of natural gas, “which prompted some utilities to switch back to a dirtier 
energy source—coal.”63 The United States is the second-worst country for CO2 
emissions, but it is nipping at China’s heels.64 Unfortunately, the United States 
and many other highly developed countries seem unlikely to reverse the trend 
anytime soon: 
[I]f people believe there is a quick technological fix out there for global warm-
ing, they will ask why we should bother going through all the pain and struggle 
of reinventing the world’s energy systems. After all, who wants to pay higher 
electric bills, move to a smaller house, or give up their third TV if we can just 
throw some dust in the air and cool off the planet? This is a version of the classic 
“moral hazard” argument that economists use frequently to underscore why 
flood insurance encourages people to build homes in flood-prone locations, or 
why bank bailouts discourage investment firms from instituting real reforms. If 
someone else is going to cover the loss, it greatly lessens the urgency of taking 
responsibility for one’s own actions.65 
This moral hazard leads to the third argument against geoengineering, that 
it is “evidence of exactly the same kind of industrial thinking that cooked the 
planet in the first place.”66 The root problem is that “Western civilization as we 
know it is unsustainable.”67 The climatic footprint that an average family 
makes, with their SUVs, multiple TVs, and endless energy consumption, can-
not be balanced out by recycling a few soda cans here and there. Hence, our 
lavish lifestyle “compels us to chase after a technological fix—a high-tech 
Band-Aid that will solve all our problems.”68  
Through a legal lens, geoengineering raises another shadow of doubt re-
garding accountability. Even if the international legal arena adopts a geoengi-
neering treaty, how can one prove that a particular type of weather at a particu-
lar time was geoengineered? The problem is that modern science will allow us 
to engage in geoengineering, but not necessarily to measure its true impact: 
                                                        
61  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 19. 
62  Sarah Wolfe, Dirty Deeds: The World’s Biggest Polluters by Country, GLOBALPOST (Jan. 
14, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/science/global-warming 
/140113/dirty-deeds-the-worlds-biggest-polluters-co2-emissions-country. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
66  Id. at 20. 
67  Id. at 21. 
68  Id. 
Spring 2015] GEOENGINEERING 1069 
If we take an active role in managing the planet, we will replace mystery and 
beauty with lousy engineering. If it rains too little, we will curse the engineers at 
Climate Control Center. If it rains too much, we will curse them again. Once in a 
while, they will get it right, and once in a while, we will be grateful.69 
It is not difficult to see, then, how the floodgates of litigation might conse-
quently be flung open. For example, people may start suing their governments 
regardless of whether geoengineering is actually responsible for certain chang-
es in the weather: some may sue because the fog from sulfate aerosols depress-
es them; some may sue because their plants are not growing properly; and some 
may sue because the fog blocked their million-dollar ocean view. Regardless of 
the reason, if people believe the government is affecting the weather, then they 
may also believe the government is to blame whenever something goes wrong. 
Because it is not clear how to distinguish between geoengineered weather and 
naturally-occurring weather,70 society’s already underfunded judicial resources 
would be consumed by weather-related lawsuits.  
Therefore, with these arguments in mind, and to ensure the safety and ef-
fectiveness of geoengineering practices, it is essential to establish a legal 
framework that provides sufficient legal accountability in the unfortunate event 
of a geoengineered catastrophe. 
II. RESEARCH FINDINGS—CASE STUDIES 
In order to answer the important research question—how can international 
law provide sufficient legal accountability in case of a catastrophic accident 
from geoengineering—this note uses four different case studies as the form of 
analysis. Due to the lack of international law regarding the specific issue of ac-
countability for geoengineering practices, this note examines different bodies of 
international law and U.S. environmental practices in order to determine the 
best comparative framework for this narrow question.71 Even though they are 
distinct bodies of international law, the legal frameworks for arms control, in-
tellectual property rights, and environmental law all have features applicable to 
an international agreement that could be used as a legal framework for geoen-
gineering accountability. 
For each of the four case studies, this note briefly discusses the basic prin-
ciples of each international agreement or U.S. federal statute, before specifical-
ly focusing on the issue of accountability, regulation, and enforceability. For 
the first case study, in the field of arms control, this note investigates ENMOD 
                                                        
69  Id. at 218. 
70  See infra Part II(B) (discussing the use of environmental impact assessments as a pre-
sumption of liability). 
71  Examining different fields of law is a recommended practice for geoengineering due to 
the lack of applicable international law. See IPCC, supra note 8, at 34. (“[Geoengineering] 
relies on the flexible adaptation, or possible amendment, of existing treaty rules or the appli-
cation of customary international law rules, seeking to employ the legal tools at hand to 
regulate geoengineering activities.”). 
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to showcase the only current legal framework for environmental modification 
techniques. Although ENMOD’s prevention of hostile or military uses of envi-
ronmental modification techniques does not regulate the use of peaceful weath-
er modification or geoengineering,72 the examination of ENMOD shows the 
predicaments that the international arena faces when trying to create accounta-
bility for environmental modification techniques. The second case study, the 
National Environmental Policy Act, requires certain environmental impact as-
sessments when a federal undertaking may significantly impact the environ-
ment. This Act provides the framework for how a geoengineering treaty should 
be regulated and how it can overcome the issue of proving environmental mod-
ification techniques actually caused the damaging weather or climate.  
In the third case study, this note studies the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) to analyze issues 
of legal accountability in international law regarding intellectual property. The 
TRIPS Agreement, administered by the World Trade Organization, offers dis-
pute settlement strategies and levels of accountability for international viola-
tions of intellectual property rights. For the fourth case study, in the field of en-
vironmental law, the Montreal Protocol provides a legal framework for 
governmental liability and enforcement. Although the Montreal Protocol is not 
the most recent or relevant international agreement in global environmental 
governance, it is the most successful case of international environmental im-
plementation.73  
A. Case Study: ENMOD 
In order to explore the legal ramifications of ENMOD in the context of 
weather modification, it is imperative to establish the series of events that led to 
the creation of ENMOD. Hence, this section analyzes the history of weather 
modification leading to ENMOD before evaluating its legal implications with 
respect to weather modification and, possibly, geoengineering. As the only 
piece of international law dealing with any type of weather modification, 
ENMOD is the most relevant treaty to geoengineering. 
Despite the fact that weather modification techniques were first officially 
performed in 1946 in the United States,74 it was not until the Vietnam War ef-
                                                        
72  Because of ENMOD’s broad definition of environmental modification techniques, if ge-
oengineering was used for hostile or military purposes, ENMOD may certainly be applica-
ble. However, the definition of geoengineering—the large-scale manipulation of the Earth’s 
climate to counteract global warming—makes clear that geoengineering is solely used for 
peaceful purposes. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 8. If geoengineering was used for military 
or other hostile uses, it would not be considered geoengineering. Instead, it simply would be 
the large-scale manipulation of the Earth’s climate for military and/or hostile purposes. 
Hence, the term geoengineering signifies that peaceful purposes are intended, which would 
eliminate ENMOD’s applicability. 
73  Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance Against Abrupt 
Climate Change, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 3, 4 (2007). 
74  GOODELL, supra note 1, at 171–72. 
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fort that this new science received international recognition. The Department of 
Defense (“DOD”) finally had to admit to its use of cloud seeding in North Vi-
etnam from 1967–1972.75 The Senate, as directed by Senator Claiborne Pell, 
then held a hearing regarding the United States’ use of weather modification for 
military purposes.76 Colonel Ed Soyster, Chief Advisor to the committee hear-
ing, explained that he, and many notable scientists, believed that cloud seeding 
was an acceptable tactic to use in warfare because it (supposedly) has no harm-
ful effects to civilians.77 He exemplified this belief by saying: “It is the consen-
sus of the scientific community that the techniques employed could not be used 
to create large uncontrolled storm systems accidentally or purposely.”78 During 
that same Congressional hearing, the DOD admitted to using cloud-seeding 
techniques in Vietnam for a period of about six years; however, the DOD de-
nied the allegation that the United States military was responsible for the devas-
tating floods that North Vietnam faced in 1971, which caused expansive civil-
ian suffering.79 A representative from the DOD claimed that those floods were 
caused by natural rainfall.80 
After Senator Pell, a strong advocate for banning weather modification, 
publicized the secret rainmaking program that the United States was using in 
North Vietnam, an international uproar began over the potential possibilities of 
weather modification.81 Senator Pell led the Senate to vote for a resolution that 
would urge the Administration to seek a treaty banning weather modification in 
warfare.82 As Senator Pell explained, these environmental weather modification 
techniques include, but are not limited to, melting polar ice, steering hurricanes, 
and the inducement of rainfall, earthquakes, and tidal waves.83 As if the threat 
of Mother Nature as a weapon is not frightening enough, the United States had 
to worry about this science getting into the hands of a state actor with bad in-
tentions or a lack of knowledge about the potential consequences of weather 
modification.  
                                                        
75  Briefing on Dep’t of Defense Weather Modification Activity: Hearing on Weather Modifi-
cation Before the Subcomm. on Oceans & Int’l Env’t of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
93rd Cong. 88 (1974). 
76  Id. at 87. 
77  Id. at 87, 92–93. 
78  Id. at 93. Colonel Soyster explained that cloud seeding techniques were not overused; 
once they achieved the result they desired, they would shift locations. Id. Also, Soyster stat-
ed that cloud seeding was not used during tropical rainstorms or when large amounts of rain-
fall already existed. Id. 
79  Id. at 118. 
80  Id. 
81  See Bernard Gwertzman, A U.S.-Soviet Ban on Weather Use for War Is Near, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 24, 1975, at 1. 
82  Id. at 1, 7 (stating that when a resolution was brought to the Senate to urge the administra-
tion to ban weather modification techniques in warfare, it overwhelmingly passed 82–10). 
83  Id. at 7. 
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During this same era, the United States was in a cold war with Russia.84 
This context further fueled the fear that weather modification techniques were 
being developed for use against the United States. However, after the Soviet 
Communist Party Leader, Leonid Brezhnev, met with Senator Pell on his trip to 
Washington, D.C., he realized the possible hazards of the issue and later met 
with President Nixon to draft an agreement on banning weather modification 
techniques in warfare.85 In their negotiations, the two leaders said that in an ef-
fort to “limit the potential danger to mankind from possible new means of war-
fare,” they decided the possibilities of an environmental warfare ban should be 
explored.86 They also stated that weather modification might have “widespread, 
long-lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare,”87 words which later 
became the basis for ENMOD. This similarity in language is due to the fact that 
the Soviet Union called for this ban at the United Nations’ General Assembly 
in 1976, which, as history has shown, led to ENMOD.88 
The ambiguity of whether rain—in general—was induced by cloud seeding 
was a contributing factor to the proposal of ENMOD. Even with the prohibition 
of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, 
there is still a question of how a state can be certain whether it is facing natural 
or induced weather. If a nation may avoid repercussions merely be claiming it 
had no part in weather modification, then the possibilities of weather modifica-
tion being used as an untraceable weapon will increase.  
Unfortunately, geoengineering, despite its catastrophic risks, is not current-
ly considered to be a violation of ENMOD. As exemplified by its formal title—
the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification Techniques—ENMOD clearly establishes that 
weather modification can be practiced as long as it is not used as a weapon.89 
Indeed, Article One provides that parties are only prohibited from using these 
environmental techniques with “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as 
the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”90  
Scholar Lawrence Juda addresses the ambiguities and loopholes caused by 
including the threshold requirement that weather modification techniques are 
                                                        
84  See generally Quintard Taylor, Jr., United States History: Timeline: Cold War, U. WASH. 
DEP’T HIST., http://faculty.washington.edu/qtaylor/a_us_history/cold_war_timeline.htm (last 
visited May 27, 2015) (stating that the Cold War lasted from 1945 to 1991). 
85  Gwertzman, supra note 81, at 1, 7. 
86  Id. at 1. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. For a history of the negotiations leading to ENMOD, see Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques—
Narrative, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4783.htm (last visited May 27, 2015). 
89  See ENMOD, supra note 13. 
90  Id. at art. I (emphasis added). 
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only prohibited if they have “widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.”91 
State actors, as Juda explains, have the ability to use environmental modifica-
tion techniques for hostile or military purposes as long as they do not meet the 
above criteria.92 Furthermore, Juda argues that the incorporation of the term 
“hostile use” in Article One was “questioned since damage to other states could 
result from the attempt to modify the environment for peaceful purposes such 
as through programs of precipitation enhancement.”93 Consequently, Juda asks: 
“How is ‘hostile’ intent to be established?”94 This question is still a matter of 
controversy, and it will surely be debated during the negotiation of any interna-
tional agreement for geoengineering, especially regarding accountability for 
geoengineered catastrophes.  
Although ENMOD addresses the potential risks of environmental modifi-
cation techniques to human welfare, it still grants absolute freedom and pro-
vides zero regulation for the use of such techniques for peaceful purposes.95 As 
stated in Article Three, a state has the right to participate in and facilitate, to the 
fullest possible extent, the science of environmental modification in accordance 
with international law.96 One important aspect of Article Three is its explana-
tion that environmental modification can be used for peaceful purposes with the 
intent of “preservation, improvement and peaceful utilization of the environ-
ment, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the 
world.”97 With the latter in mind, consider another example of China’s use of 
weather modification—rain prevention to make the weather more convenient 
during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.98 It would be difficult to argue that China’s 
use of weather modification for the Olympics was done with the intent to pre-
serve or improve the environment.99 Hence, China’s practice of altering the 
climate was simply used as a tool for convenience, economics, and reputation, 
which arguably are not permissible purposes covered by ENMOD. 
                                                        
91  Lawrence Juda, Negotiating a Treaty on Environmental Modification Warfare: The Con-
vention on Environmental Warfare and Its Impact upon Arms Control Negotiations, 32 INT’L 
ORG. 975, 980 (1978). 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  See ENMOD, supra note 13, at art. III(1). 
96  Id. at art. III(2). 
97  Id. A question not addressed by ENMOD is the use of weather modification for recrea-
tional purposes and convenience, such as the Chinese did in the Beijing blizzard tragedy, to 
make farming possible during the drought, or the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
98  Yu Zheng, Beijing Uses High-Tech to Prevent Rain from Dampening Olympic Opening, 
CHINA VIEW (July 28, 2008, 1:20 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/28 
/content_8787101.htm (stating that in an effort to save the opening Olympic ceremony from 
rainfall, the Beijing Weather Engineering Office used satellite monitoring and cloud seed-
ing); see also Barbara Demick, China Plans to Halt Rain for Olympics, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2008, at A3. 
99  See generally Yu Zheng, supra note 98 (stating that Beijing used cloud seeding to prevent 
rain during the Olympic opening). 
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Article Two of ENMOD defines the term “environmental modification 
techniques” to include the following: “[A]ny technique for changing—through 
the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or 
structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmos-
phere, or of outer space.”100 Although this definition may encompass geoengi-
neering techniques, at least in a legal and technical sense, ENMOD does not 
incorporate any legal framework for the issue of accountability in cases of envi-
ronmental modification catastrophes, nor does it regulate the use of environ-
mental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. Article Five of ENMOD 
describes the only part of the treaty regarding breach. Article Five states: “Any 
State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that any other State 
Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the 
Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Na-
tions.”101 Furthermore, Article Five explains that the Security Council will in-
vestigate such a complaint.102 However, ENMOD does not specifically mention 
the examination of intent—whether for hostile and military purposes or peace-
ful purposes—and it similarly does not address accountability. Consequently, 
ENMOD is insufficient to provide the framework for legal accountability in 
cases of geoengineered catastrophes. 
ENMOD does not regulate the use of environmental modification tech-
niques for peaceful purposes. Instead, ENMOD simply states it does not “hin-
der the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.”103 
By not hindering its use, while also not regulating it, state actors can practice 
“peaceful” environmental modification techniques in compliance with 
ENMOD, but without any oversight. It is, therefore, necessary to look at other 
areas of international law to develop a legal framework for the issues of ac-
countability, regulation, and enforcement. 
B. Case Study: National Environmental Policy Act 
The Environmental Protection Agency, a U.S. federal agency, oversees the 
enforcement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) 
through the Council on Environmental Quality.104 NEPA “requires federal 
agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision making processes 
by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reason-
able alternatives to those actions.”105 To comply with NEPA, federal agencies 
                                                        
100  ENMOD, supra note 13, at art. II. 
101  Id. at art. V(3). 
102  Id. at art. V(4). 
103  Id. at art. III(1). 
104  42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); National Environmental Policy Act: Basic Information, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (last updated May 4, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/compliance 
/basics/nepa.html [hereinafter NEPA: Basic Information]. 
105  National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (last up-
dated Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/. 
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are required to “prepare detailed statements assessing the environmental impact 
of and alternatives to major federal actions significantly affecting the environ-
ment,” which are commonly referred to as environmental impact statements.106 
Environmental impact statements must be made available to the public before 
any action is taken or any decisions are made.107 Further, NEPA states that the 
purpose of the environmental impact statements is to provide high quality in-
formation that is central to the action in question and is based on “[a]ccurate 
scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny.”108 
The NEPA process—used to evaluate the potential environmental effects 
of a federal undertaking, along with its alternatives—has three levels of analy-
sis: (1) categorical exclusions; (2) environmental assessments; and (3) envi-
ronmental impact statements.109 First, categorical exclusions, as its name im-
plies, allows federal agencies to avoid the research and preparation of 
environmental assessments or environmental impact statements for certain un-
dertakings.110 If the Council on Environmental Quality already has determined 
that a particular undertaking does not have significant environmental impact, it 
serves as a precedent for federal agencies to determine that it is normally ex-
cluded from environmental evaluation under NEPA.111 
The second and third levels of scrutiny under NEPA require research, thor-
ough analysis, and written assessments to determine whether an environmental 
impact exists. Regarding environmental assessments, a federal agency is re-
quired to submit a written proposal that includes the following: “[t]he need for 
the proposal; [a]lternatives (when there is an unresolved conflict concerning 
alternative uses of available resources); [t]he environmental impacts of the pro-
posed action and alternatives; [and a] listing of agencies and persons consult-
ed.”112 The purpose of the environmental assessment is to “determine whether 
or not a federal undertaking would significantly affect the environment.”113 If 
the proposed federal undertaking would not significantly affect the environ-
ment, the agency shall prepare a “finding of no significant impact.”114 
                                                        
106  NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
107  40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2014). 
108  Id.; see also id. § 1502.1 (“[Environmental impact statements] shall provide full and fair 
discussion of significant environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the 
public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or en-
hance the quality of the human environment. Agencies shall focus on significant environ-
mental issues and alternatives and shall reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extrane-
ous background data. Statements shall be concise, clear, and to the point, and shall be 
supported by evidence that the agency has made the necessary environmental analyses.”). 
109  NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. For examples of federal undertakings that are categorically excluded by statute, see 
23 C.F.R. § 771.117(c) (2014) (excluding undertakings, such as landscaping and the con-
struction of pedestrian and bicycle lanes, paths, and facilities). 
112  NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b). 
113  NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104 (emphasis added). 
114  Id. 
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On the other hand, if an environmental assessment determines that the fed-
eral undertaking would significantly affect the environment, the federal agency 
must prepare an environmental impact statement, which is the third level of 
analysis under NEPA.115 Compared to the environmental assessment, an envi-
ronmental impact statement is more detailed in relation to the proposed under-
taking and possible alternatives.116 An environmental impact statement in-
cludes: “[d]iscussions of the purpose of and need for the action; [a]lternatives; 
[t]he affected environment; [t]he environmental consequences of the proposed 
action; [l]ists of preparers, agencies, organizations and persons to whom the 
statement is sent; [a]n index; [and an] appendix (if any).”117 
One of the main benefits about the NEPA process is the transparency for 
the public. The NEPA process allows the public to comment on an agency’s 
NEPA documents, attend hearings or public meetings, and submit comments 
directly to the federal agency.118 Congress declared that one of the purposes of 
NEPA is to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and 
his environment; . . . [and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological sys-
tems and natural resources important to the Nation.”119 To achieve this connec-
tion between man and his environment, man must be allowed to play an active 
role in undertakings that may significantly impact the environment. 
Environmental impact statements and assessments (collectively referred to 
as “Environmental Impact Assessments”) provide many benefits to the agency 
or developer.120 In addition to Environmental Impact Assessments demonstrat-
ing due diligence to defend against a claim of negligence, Environmental Im-
pact Assessments also “can lead to more environmentally sensitive develop-
ment; to improved relations between the developer, the planning authority and 
the local communities; [and] to a smoother development consent process.”121 
The NEPA process provides an applicable framework to a geoengineering 
treaty. Adopting the NEPA process would solve several issues. First, requiring 
Environmental Impact Assessments would regulate environmental modification 
techniques. Like the Environmental Protection Agency has the Council on En-
vironmental Quality, an international body could be established to regulate the 
                                                        
115  40 C.F.R. § 1501.4; NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104. If an agency anticipates 
that its undertaking will significantly impact the environment, the agency can skip level 
two—filing an environmental assessment—and file an environmental impact statement. Id. 
116  NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104. 
117  Id. 
118  Id.; Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY 
(last updated Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/eisdata.html (“All EISs are 
filed with EPA, and EPA publishes a ‘Notice of Availability’ each week in the Federal Reg-
ister. The ‘Notice of Availability’ is the start of the 45-day public comment period for Draft 
EISs. This notice is also the start of the 30-day ‘wait period’ for Final EISs, in which agen-
cies are generally required to wait 30 days before making a decision on a proposed action.”). 
119  42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). 
120  JOHN GLASSON ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 7 (4th 
ed., 2012). 
121  Id. 
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Environmental Impact Assessments. This note will refer to such potential inter-
national agency as CENMOD,122 which would have current information on all 
proposed and practiced geoengineering or weather modification techniques. 
Further, by adopting the three-tiered level of analysis for environmental modi-
fication undertakings, CENMOD could categorically exclude certain types of 
small-scale environmental modification techniques. For example, scientists 
could determine a safe and effective amount of silver iodide to disperse among 
clouds per square mile. If farmers desired to cloud seed their own land, there 
would be no need to go through the Environmental Impact Assessments as long 
as the proposal fell within a certain threshold category. On the other hand, a 
country could skip the second tier of the analysis and issue an environmental 
impact statement if it knew that its proposal would have a significant impact on 
the environment, just like federal agencies do under NEPA.123  
Regulation of environmental modification techniques—geoengineering and 
weather modification—is imperative to ensure the health of the environment. 
By requiring state actors to submit Environmental Impact Assessments, 
CENMOD, using a panel of experts, could oversee the frequency of environ-
mental modification techniques. Due to the underdeveloped nature of geoengi-
neering, the long-term effects of proposed geoengineering techniques on the 
environment, such as using sulfate aerosols, is unclear. CENMOD could estab-
lish regulations to ensure that state actors were not damaging the health of the 
environment, the eco-systems, or the world’s population.124 
Also, the requirement that Environmental Impact Assessments be pub-
lished for the public should be incorporated into a geoengineering treaty.125 For 
example, if the United States wanted to practice geoengineering, its environ-
mental impact statement may include the possible impact on neighboring coun-
tries, such as Canada and Mexico. The United States would submit its report to 
CENMOD to ensure that it would be publicly available to all countries.  
A further issue that the NEPA process would help solve is the issue of 
proving whether a state actor using environmental modification techniques 
caused any particular climatic effect. One of the largest hurdles in a geoengi-
neering treaty is the ability for a state actor to prove that the damage it suffered 
from some type of weather or climate change is the result of another state ac-
tor’s use of geoengineering or weather modification, instead of simply Mother 
                                                        
122  Following the popular acronym of “ENMOD,” I propose that this international governing 
body be nicknamed: “CENMOD”—Council on Environmental Modification. 
123  NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104. 
124  For example, if a state actor decided to use sulfate aerosols to cool itself down, 
CENMOD may have regulations on the use of the sulfate aerosols: how high must the aero-
sols be dispersed to avoid it affecting the environment below; what measurement of sulfate 
aerosols is safe; how often can sulfate aerosols be dispersed; can every state actor simultane-
ously disperse sulfate aerosols or do state actors need to take turns? 
125  NEPA: Basic Information, supra note 104. 
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Nature.126 Environmental Impact Assessments can help solve that issue because 
they would provide for a public record of a state actor’s use of environmental 
modification techniques. If a state actor encountered an unusual weather or 
climate pattern that caused damage, such as the Beijing blizzard, it could inves-
tigate Environmental Impact Assessments filed with CENMOD. The damaged 
state actor could then use the Environmental Impact Assessments as a presump-
tion of liability in a dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, the adoption of 
the NEPA process not only provides for safer environmental practices, but also 
the requirement of state actors submitting Environmental Impact Assessments 
as a form of regulation would facilitate CENMOD to provide sufficient legal 
accountability in cases of catastrophe or damage. 
C. Case Study: TRIPS Agreement 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
referred to as the TRIPS Agreement, is an international agreement administered 
by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).127 This Agreement deals with the 
minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property regulations for 
WTO member states.128 Due to its strict regulations and the creation of the Dis-
pute Settlement Body,129 the TRIPS Agreement provides an example of the 
possible legal framework for an international geoengineering agreement. Fur-
thermore, the TRIPS Agreement incorporates a strictly enforced framework for 
accountability from violations of intellectual property rights.130 In order to 
showcase the applicability of the TRIPS Agreement to a potential geoengineer-
ing agreement, this section first examines key articles of the TRIPS Agreement, 
while detailing the process of the Dispute Settlement Body. 
The TRIPS Agreement was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in 1994.131 GATT be-
came the basis for the establishment of the World Trade Organization.132 The 
TRIPS Agreement is a compulsory requirement of WTO membership.133 Con-
                                                        
126  Scientists ‘Cause’ Beijing Snow, supra note 5 (“Even if it is theoretically possible, one of 
the problems for proponents has been to demonstrate that a rainfall or snowfall was caused 
by the seeding or simply occurred spontaneously.”). 
127  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 300 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. at art. 64. 
130  See id. at art. 41. 
131  Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org 
/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited May 27, 2015). 
132  Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
54 INT’L ORG. 421, 436 (2000) (“Over time, GATT developed into the WTO as states 
learned the advantages of harder legalization in governing international trade.”). 
133  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 1(1). Article 1 requires WTO members to 
“give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.” Id. 
Spring 2015] GEOENGINEERING 1079 
sequently, countries that seek to acquire easy access to the international mar-
kets through the WTO must ratify the strict intellectual property laws mandated 
by TRIPS. The TRIPS Agreement created the Dispute Settlement Body that the 
member governments must use when a dispute arises.134 Prior to the Dispute 
Settlement Body, international intellectual property law “did not provide any 
practical means of recourse, at the multilateral level, to a government that be-
lieved that another government was not living up to its obligations.”135  
A dispute occurs “when a member government believes another member 
government is violating a WTO agreement. The complaining member must 
submit a ‘request for consultations’ identifying the agreements it believes are 
being violated.”136 The first stage of the Dispute Settlement Body process is the 
consultation stage.137 The consultation stage is an alternative dispute resolution 
process that allows up to sixty days for the countries to settle the claim—either 
on their own or in mediation with the WTO director-general.138 If the consulta-
tions are unsuccessful, the “complaining country can ask for a panel to be ap-
pointed.”139 Once a request for a panel is filed, it can take up to forty-five days 
for the Dispute Settlement Body to appoint a panel, and up to six months for 
the panel to issue its report.140 
The panel stage consists of written arguments, oral arguments, and prelim-
inary reports between the countries and the panel.141 The first requirement in 
the panel stage involves each country with an interest in the dispute “pre-
sent[ing] its case in writing to the panel.”142 Then, the panel will hold its first 
hearing, in which each interested country will argue its case.143 After having the 
opportunity to hear each country’s arguments, the countries may “submit writ-
ten rebuttals and present oral arguments at the panel’s second meeting.”144 If 
one country’s case involves “scientific or other technical matters, the panel may 
                                                        
134  Id. at art. 64(1). The Dispute Settlement Body is “[m]ade up of all member governments, 
usually represented by ambassadors or equivalent.” Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited May 27, 2015). 
135  Matthijs Geuze & Hannu Wager, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the 
TRIPS Agreement, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 347, 347 (1999). 
136  Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A26 (last visited May 27, 2015). 
137  Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited May 27, 
2015). 
138  Id. 
139  Id. The Dispute Settlement Body, at its discretion, may establish a panel, which “help[s] 
the Dispute Settlement Body make rulings or recommendations.” Id. However, the Dispute 
Settlement Body can accept the panel’s report, or reject it with a consensus of the Dispute 
Settlement Body. Id. “Panels consist of three (possibly five) experts from different countries 
who examine the evidence and decide who is right and who is wrong.” Id. 
140  Id. The responding country is allowed to block the creation of the panel one time. Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
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consult experts or appoint an expert review group to prepare an advisory re-
port.”145 The panel then submits drafts and interim reports of the facts and ar-
guments involved, along with its findings and conclusions.146 Each country in 
the dispute has an opportunity to review the drafts, interim reports, and final 
report; if necessary, the panel can hold additional meetings with the interested 
countries.147 Once the panel releases its final report to all WTO members, it be-
comes a “ruling” of the Dispute Settlement Body within sixty days, unless a 
consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body rejects the panel’s final report.148 
The “Dispute Settlement Body is available as an ultimate arbiter.”149 In 
cases of damages done to the rightful intellectual property holder, the WTO has 
the judicial authority to order the infringer to pay adequate compensation and 
expenses, which may include attorney’s fees.150 This compensation can also 
apply retrospectively to the damages incurred during unintentional infringe-
ment.151 The infringing country must follow the recommendations of the pan-
el’s report. If it cannot comply, it must state its intention to the Dispute Settle-
ment Body and explain any reasons of impracticability or needing a longer 
period of time to comply. If this occurs, then the complaining country can re-
quest permission from the Disputed Settlement Body to retaliate.152 Among 
other things, retaliation can involve “suspend[ing] concessions or other obliga-
tions” and/or raising import duties.153 
The TRIPS Agreement provides the international arena with an efficient 
legal framework that encompasses the issue of accountability for violations. 
This framework can be analogously applied to geoengineering and its potential 
for catastrophe. Similar to the TRIPS Agreement’s use of the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body, international disputes regarding geoengineering may call for 
some sort of dispute settlement body within CENMOD. To be useful, it would 
need to be strict and have greater enforcement power than a mere complaint 
and investigation system.  
The Dispute Settlement Body’s process will be beneficial for a geoengi-
neering treaty because of its alternative dispute resolution requirement154 and 
                                                        
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Webster D. McBride, GI Joe? Coffee, Location, and Regulatory Accountability, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2138, 2158 (2010). 
150  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 127, at art. 45. 
151  Id. 
152  Understanding the WTO, supra note 137. 
153  Id. (“In principle, the retaliation should be in the same sector as the dispute. If this is not 
practical or if it would not be effective, it can be in a different sector of the same agreement. 
In turn, if this is not effective or practicable and if the circumstances are not serious enough, 
the action can be taken under another agreement.”). 
154  The alternative dispute resolution process of the “consultation” stage of the Dispute Set-
tlement Body allows most claims to be settled without the use of panels. Geuze & Wager, 
supra note 135, at 375 (“Most disputes about matters of compliance with the requirements of 
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its use of panels and experts on issues of science and technology. Because ge-
oengineering and all environmental modification techniques are difficult to 
prove, a panel of three to five different experts—including geoengineers, clima-
tologists, scientists, and lawyers—from different countries will allow for exper-
tise that surpasses the typical judicial tribunal. Moreover, the continual ex-
change between arguments, drafts, interim reports, and final reports allows 
countries to ensure that the panel correctly understands their arguments and the 
science supporting them.  
Although the TRIPS Agreement involves intellectual property, it provides 
a great example of the structure that a geoengineering treaty may encompass. 
The use of the Dispute Settlement Body is the most important tool for any po-
tential geoengineering treaty because inquiry without any means for enforce-
ment or repercussions will fail to produce any real results. By adding the prin-
ciples of the TRIPS Agreement to ENMOD, ENMOD would progress toward 
becoming a more appropriate international treaty to address the issue of ac-
countability for geoengineered catastrophes.  
D. Case Study: Montreal Protocol 
The Montreal Protocol, officially known as the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, came into effect when signed on Sep-
tember 16, 1987.155 Although there are more recent or relevant international 
agreements in global environmental governance,156 the Montreal Protocol is the 
most successful case of international environmental implementation.157 Conse-
quently, the Montreal Protocol—considered a historic event for a range of rea-
sons158—offers two main elements that could be incorporated into a geoengi-
neering treaty. First, it is the first treaty that adopted the “precautionary 
approach,” meaning governments implement substantial measures for environ-
mental protection before complete knowledge about the threat has been prov-
en.159 Second, the Montreal Protocol is the first environmental treaty in which 
state actors consensually incorporated a “formal noncompliance procedure.”160 
This noncompliance procedure offers positive and negative incentives through 
                                                                                                                                
the TRIPS Agreement are resolved in bilateral consultations between the Members con-
cerned, either in Geneva or in capitals, without invoking the dispute settlement procedures in 
the [Dispute Settlement Body].”). 
155  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
156  See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005). 
157  Kaniaru et al., supra note 73. 
158  Shinya Murase et al., Compliance-Control in Respect of the Montreal Protocol, 89 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. 206, 206 (1995). 
159  Id.; see also Brief Primer on the Montreal Protocol, UN ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/MP_Brief_Primer_on_MP-E.pdf (last visited May 27, 
2015). 
160  Murase et al., supra note 158. 
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the use of the Multilateral Fund and trade restrictions, respectively. The Mon-
treal Protocol’s precautionary principle and noncompliance procedure provide 
another basis for an international treaty vis-à-vis legal accountability of geoen-
gineering.  
The precautionary principle is applicable “[w]hen human activities may 
lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, 
actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm.”161 However, “a mere 
fantasy or crude speculation that an activity or new technology causes harm is 
not enough to trigger the [precautionary principle].”162 To recommend precau-
tionary intervention, there must be judgments based on scientific analysis that 
give rise to “reasonable grounds for concern.”163 Essentially, “this principle 
says that, rather than await certainty, regulators should act in anticipation of 
environmental harm to ensure that this harm does not occur.”164 The Montreal 
Protocol acted in anticipation of the environmental damage from ozone-
depleting substances because “[t]he science of ozone depletion was uncertain 
when the Montreal Protocol was negotiated in 1987.”165  
The Montreal Protocol’s noncompliance procedure has proven to be suc-
cessful because it applies a combination of positive and negative incentives.166 
First, the Montreal Protocol uses positive incentives through the use of the 
Multilateral Fund.167 Second, the Montreal Protocol uses negative incentives 
from the threat of trade restrictions to ensure compliance.168 Regarding the pos-
itive incentives, the noncompliance procedure has a dual standard for different 
state actors depending on whether it is a wealthy, industrialized state or a de-
veloping country.169 The Montreal Protocol recognizes that the “commitments 
of developing states are often contingent on their receipt of adequate resources 
to fulfill those commitments.”170 Consequently, the noncompliance procedure 
provides two resources to help developing nations: (1) a grace period for the 
state actor to provide enough time to acquire the financial and technological re-
sources to meet its obligations; and (2) a Multilateral Fund to which wealthier 
                                                        
161  WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., U.N. EDUC., 
SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 14 box 2 (2005). 
162  Id. at 50. 
163  Charles Weiss, Defining Precaution, 49 ENVIRONMENT 33, 34 (2007) (reviewing WORLD 
COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE & TECH., U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & 
CULTURAL ORG., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)). 
164  Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, 33 
ENVIRONMENT 4, 4 (1991). 
165  Atmospheric Pressure: Why Some Environmental Agreements Work and Others Don’t, 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1715055. 
166  Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, Increasing Participation and Compliance in Internation-
al Climate Change Agreements, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & ECON. 349, 360–66 
(2003) (discussing the positive and negative incentives of the Montreal Protocol). 
167  Id. at 361. 
168  Id. at 365. 
169  See Montreal Protocol, supra note 155, at art. 5. 
170  SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (2006). 
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states contribute to help developing nations to reduce their emissions.171 On the 
other hand, industrialized nations must report to the Protocol Implementation 
committee if they cannot meet their emission obligations.172 Otherwise, the 
Montreal Protocol encourages whistleblowing on noncompliant states.173  
Whether self-reported or reported by another party for noncompliance, the 
implementation committee works with the noncompliant developing nation by 
encouraging wealthier states to provide financial, technological, or other re-
sources to achieve compliance through the Multilateral Fund.174 Hence, the in-
dustrialized countries pay the incremental costs of implementing the Montreal 
Protocol. The Montreal Protocol did not just encourage countries to reduce 
their own emissions, but it also encouraged industrialized countries to pay de-
veloping countries through the Multilateral Fund to reduce those countries’ 
emissions as well.175 Similar to the emission reductions, the contributions to the 
Multilateral Fund are an obligation for certain state actors that have surpassed a 
threshold level of consumption of ozone-depleting substances.176 
Instead of solely using positive, financial incentives to increase compliance 
with emission reductions, the Montreal Protocol used a credible threat of re-
stricting trade regarding chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), a known ozone-
depleting substance, and products containing CFCs.177 Although trade has not 
actually been restricted, the “belief that trade would be restricted if countries 
failed to participate had the effect of promoting participation.”178 Negative in-
centives, such as trade restrictions, are justifiable for the Montreal Protocol: 
The justification for using trade restrictions also depends on the perceived 
fairness of an international treaty. No country could gain from ozone depletion, 
and the countries that would gain the least from ozone protection—developing 
countries—were compensated for participating in the Montreal Protocol. This 
made the threat to impose restrictions appear to be fair.179 
Although the damage caused by CFCs to the ozone layer has a detrimental 
effect on the entire planet, several countries did not see any type of benefit, on-
ly economic difficulties, if they were to ratify the Montreal Protocol. Neverthe-
less, the incentives set forth by the Montreal Protocol, coupled with the non-
                                                        
171  Id. 
172  Id. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. at 162–63. 
175  See Barrett & Stavins, supra note 166, at 361. 
176  Contributing countries are any country that is not considered an “Article 5” country. 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, MULTILATERAL FUND, 
http://www.multilateralfund.org/default.aspx (last visited May 27, 2015). Article 5 countries 
are determined if their annual level of consumption of ozone-depleting substances is “less 
than 0.3 kilograms per capita to comply with the control measures of the Protocol.” Id. 
177  Barrett & Stavins, supra note 166, at 365; see also Montreal Protocol, supra note 155, at 
art. 4. 
178  Barrett & Stavins, supra note 166, at 365. 
179  Id. at 366. 
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compliance procedures, have been successful.180 Specifically, the noncompli-
ance procedure that threatens trade sanctions, while also providing community 
support through the Multilateral Fund, has proven to be effective.181 Having 
phased out almost one hundred ozone-depleting substances by nearly 100 per-
cent in industrialized countries and at least 50–75 percent in developing coun-
tries, the Montreal Protocol is commonly considered one of the world’s most 
successful multilateral environmental agreements.182 These statistics place the 
ozone layer on a path to recovery later this century.183 The great success of the 
Montreal Protocol can be attributed to the protocol’s “evolutionary process,” 
which has been adjusted repeatedly over its “nearly twenty year history to re-
flect current developments in scientific understanding and technological capa-
bilities.”184 To maintain the most efficient and contemporary environmental 
treaty, as showcased by the Montreal Protocol’s success, it is imperative to con-
tinually adapt to the changes in science, technology, and the climate.  
This evolutionary process, along with the pioneering efforts to enforce 
compliance, make the Montreal Protocol a stellar example of the legal frame-
work that could be adopted—at least partially—in an international geoengi-
neering treaty. Adopted from the Montreal Protocol, the precautionary princi-
ple185 needs to be applied to geoengineering because it provides a cautious 
approach to an underdeveloped technology with the potential for hemispheric 
catastrophe. As the popular adage goes, “hope for the best, prepare for the 
worst.” Essentially, the precautionary principle adopts an assumption into the 
treaty that the worst possibility could develop when practicing geoengineering. 
Similar to the Montreal Protocol, where the science of ozone depletion was un-
certain during its negotiation, here, the science of geoengineering is also uncer-
tain. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the potential liabilities of geoengi-
neering catastrophes also need to be uncertain. Instead, state actors should have 
a clear understanding of the potential risks and liabilities associated with prac-
ticing environmental modification techniques.  
                                                        
180  Brief Primer on the Montreal Protocol, supra note 159 (“In 2009, the Montreal Protocol 
became the first treaty in history to achieve universal ratification with 196 governments (Par-
ties).”). 
181  See Kaniaru et al., supra note 73. 
182  Kaniaru et al., supra note 73, at 3; Mario Molina & Durwood Zaelke, Editorial, A Cli-
mate Success Story to Build on, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 26, 2012, at 6 (finding that the 
Montreal Protocol is twenty times more successful than the Kyoto Protocol). 
183  Kaniaru et al, supra note 73, at 3. 
184  Id. at 4; Brief Primer on the Montreal Protocol, supra note 159 (“The Protocol includes 
an adjustment provision that enables the Parties to respond to evolving science and acceler-
ate the phase-out of agreed ozone depleting substances without going through the lengthy 
formal process of national ratification. . . . The Protocol has been adjusted six times and 
amended four times since its initial adoption in 1987.”). 
185  Atmospheric Pressure, supra note 165 (stating that “[t]he science of ozone depletion was 
uncertain when the Montreal Protocol was negotiated in 1987”); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 159–65. 
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Just as the Montreal Protocol set up a Multilateral Fund to ensure compli-
ance among developing states,186 a geoengineering treaty needs to set up a 
comparable fund to maintain a balanced level of geoengineering practices be-
tween industrialized and developing nations. This fund would guarantee that 
wealthier states, which can afford expensive geoengineering techniques, would 
not be able to manipulate the climate to benefit them, while potentially worsen-
ing the climate in a developing country. For example, the shifting of a monsoon 
to increase rainfall in an industrialized country may devastate the agricultural 
practices of a developing country. Further, industrialized nations could subsi-
dize the costs associated with the research and preparation of Environmental 
Impact Assessments to ensure that developing countries are following the regu-
lations of CENMOD and as a positive incentive to developing countries that 
cannot afford the costs associated with the Environmental Impact Assessments. 
Part of the reason that the Montreal Protocol has been so successful was its low 
cost to all state actors.187 Therefore, a geoengineering treaty would need to en-
sure that the burden on state actors is relatively low, so that those who ratify the 
treaty do not suffer as a consequence.  
A geoengineering treaty would be beneficial to industrialized nations. Sim-
ilar to the Montreal Protocol’s goal of recycling ozone-depleting substances—
which affect the atmosphere, thus affecting all state actors—geoengineering al-
so has the ability to affect many state actors. Just as many state actors felt it 
was necessary to ratify ENMOD188 to prevent environmental modification 
techniques from being used as a weapon, state actors should ratify a geoengi-
neering treaty to make sure that the treaty’s regulation, accountability, and en-
forcement would safeguard against negligent practices of environmental modi-
fication techniques. Even if a state actor has peaceful intentions, environmental 
modification techniques used negligently could cause the same results as if 
those techniques were used with hostile intentions. Consequently, it should be 
the goal of all state actors to have an agreement that provides regulation, ac-
countability, and enforcement in case of a geoengineering catastrophe. 
                                                        
186  With the procedural mechanisms in place that allow a state to either self-report the state’s 
anticipated noncompliance or report the noncompliance of other states, the Montreal Proto-
col provides a checks-and-balances system that encourages obedience. See HARRO VAN 
ASSELT ET AL., ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW UNDER A 2015 CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 129 
(2015). Furthermore, because wealthier states are obliged to pay into the Multilateral Fund, 
these wealthier states put pressure on developing countries to reduce their emissions. See 
Barrett & Stavins, supra note 166, at 361. This pressure, along with the threat of trade re-
strictions, politically and economically forces compliance among state actors. These same 
mechanisms should be used for geoengineering to ensure that noncompliance comes with a 
price no state actor wants to pay. 
187  Atmospheric Pressure, supra note 165 (stating that “the costs of implementing the proto-
col were relatively low”). 
188  Seventy-six state actors are parties to ENMOD. Status of the Treaty—ENMOD, UN OFF. 
FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/enmod (last visited May 27, 
2015). 
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In order to adapt to the technological advances that will occur as time pro-
gresses, a geoengineering treaty should mimic the Montreal Protocol’s continu-
al conventions and adjustments. This evolutionary process will not only make 
the treaty continually fresh, but its constant conventions and adjustments will 
serve as an enforcement reminder to state actors that the treaty still exists and 
must be complied with. Moreover, Article 9 of the Montreal Protocol provides 
for the “exchange of information,” which is used to help developing countries 
with research, development, and public awareness.189 This concept of technolo-
gy transfer may be implemented for geoengineering practices. If other countries 
at least have the knowledge of the full capabilities of geoengineering, those 
countries can make informed decisions in the international arena. 
The Montreal Protocol provides an excellent example of enforcement for 
an international environmental treaty. Combining these fundamental principles 
from the Montreal Protocol to the foundation built from ENMOD with the pro-
posed additions from the TRIPS Agreement and NEPA, a cohesive structure for 
an international geoengineering treaty can be designed.  
III. IMPLICATIONS 
By incorporating the applicable elements from ENMOD, NEPA, the 
TRIPS Agreement, and the Montreal Protocol, this note examines how a state 
actor would be held accountable for a geoengineering catastrophe. Using the 
Beijing blizzard calamity as a base hypothetical,190 but changing the location to 
the country of Alpha, this note next analyzes how Beta—a neighboring country 
to Alpha—would seek redress for the $650 million in damage and forty deaths 
the Alpha blizzard caused from crossing into Beta.191  
Under this note’s proposed geoengineering treaty (referred to in this sec-
tion as “Treaty”), let’s rewind to Alpha’s decision to cloud seed. Assuming Al-
pha ratified the Treaty, the regulation requirements, taken from NEPA, would 
mandate that Alpha determine whether cloud seeding would be categorically 
excluded or would require an Environmental Impact Assessment. At this point, 
CENMOD is a newly developed council and has not set any precedent for cate-
gorical exclusions. Therefore, Alpha would be required to submit an environ-
mental assessment.192 This environmental assessment would need to include: 
Alpha’s need for the proposal, which in this case would be its lingering 
drought; any alternatives; the environmental impact of Alpha’s cloud seeding 
                                                        
189  Montreal Protocol, supra note 155, at art. 9. 
190  Although the Beijing blizzard was caused by cloud seeding—a form of weather modifi-
cation—instead of geoengineering, it is one of the only environmental modification disasters 
known to the public. This hypothetical provides a realistic idea of the issue of accountability 
for environmental modification techniques, as the damage caused by the Beijing blizzard is 
the same used in the hypothetical. 
191  See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
192  See supra Part II(B). 
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plan; and a list of agencies or persons consulted.193 In this environmental as-
sessment, Alpha would include the dates of the proposed cloud seeding plan (in 
this case, November 2009), the location, the amount of silver iodide involved, 
and the method of disbursement. After research and preparation of its environ-
mental assessment, Alpha determined that the proposed cloud seeding would 
not significantly affect the environment. Consequently, it filed a “finding of no 
significant impact” with CENMOD.194  
CENMOD reviewed its Environmental Impact Assessments in that region 
to determine that no other environmental modification practices would conflict 
with Alpha’s proposed plan. CENMOD published the environmental assess-
ment on its website—available to the public in September 2009.195 Starting in 
November 2009, Alpha began its cloud seeding plan. It dispersed the pre-
determined amount of silver iodide into the clouds in an effort to produce 
rain.196 However, Alpha’s continual disbursement of silver iodide, coupled with 
existing weather patterns, led to a blizzard that crossed into the country of Beta. 
The blizzard caused a total of $650 million in damage and killed forty Beta cit-
izens. 
The Beta Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, aware of Al-
pha’s plan because of CENMOD’s publication, reviewed Alpha’s environmen-
tal assessment to determine whether there may be a link between the blizzard 
and Alpha’s cloud seeding. Determined that Alpha was responsible for the 
damage from the blizzard and the death of its citizens, Beta filed a “request for 
consultations” with the Dispute Settlement Body of CENMOD. Within the six-
ty-day time period for consultations, the parties’ discussions were unproduc-
tive. The parties, therefore, requested the WTO director-general to serve as a 
mediator for the parties. Nevertheless, the parties could not reach a settle-
ment.197 
The parties moved forward through the Dispute Settlement Body by re-
questing a panel. Within forty-five days, CENMOD’s Dispute Settlement Body 
appointed a panel of five experts, comprised of scientists and lawyers. The ex-
perts were on a list of pre-qualified panelists from different countries, and Beta 
                                                        
193  For information about the requirements under NEPA for environmental assessments, see 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (2014). 
194  For more information about “findings of no significant impact,” see NEPA: Basic Infor-
mation, supra note 104. 
195  Although NEPA’s public-comment process is reserved for environmental impact state-
ments—not environmental assessments—CENMOD should publish environmental assess-
ments for purposes of demonstrating a presumption of liability in case of allegations involv-
ing environmental modification techniques. However, CENMOD can choose to reserve the 
forty-five-day public-comment process to environmental impact statements, similar to 
NEPA. See supra note 118. 
196  See supra Part I(A). 
197  Although most consultations are successful, see supra note 154, for purposes of demon-
strating the dispute settlement process, the parties do not reach an agreement. 
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had an opportunity to block the appointment of any expert.198 Once 
CENMOD’s Dispute Settlement Body finalized the panel, the parties submitted 
written arguments supporting their positions. At the first hearing, Beta argued 
that Alpha’s environmental assessment demonstrates its use of cloud seeding, 
which should serve as a presumption of liability. Because of the timing and lo-
cation of Alpha’s cloud seeding operation, the panel agreed with Beta regarding 
a presumption of liability and shifted the burden of proof to Alpha to demon-
strate that it is not liable for the damage its cloud seeding operation caused.  
At the following hearings, Alpha presented expert reports on issues of cau-
sation and climatology. Nevertheless, the panel ruled in favor of Beta, awarding 
it $500 million for the physical damage it sustained and as compensation to the 
families of the victims. The Dispute Settlement Body—through a consensus—
rejected the panel’s award because it believed that Alpha had exercised due dil-
igence in the filing of its environmental assessment. However, recognizing that 
Beta suffered damage (whether caused 100 percent by Alpha’s cloud seeding, 
or whether Alpha’s cloud seeding only exacerbated an existing blizzard), the 
Dispute Settlement Body lowered the award amount to $250 million. Under the 
threat of trade restrictions if Alpha did not comply with the Dispute Settlement 
Body’s ruling, Alpha compensated Beta. 
Although this hypothetical situation is simplistic, it provides a glimpse into 
the framework of the Treaty. In this hypothetical, Alpha was an industrialized 
nation. However, if it were a developing country, Alpha could have used the 
Multilateral Fund to receive a grant for the preparation of its environmental as-
sessment. Moreover, the Multilateral Fund could also serve as a subsidy for the 
Dispute Settlement Body’s award to Beta. In an effort to discourage negligence 
by state actors and ensure repercussions, CENMOD should only subsidize lia-
bility awards if it a state actor followed its due diligence throughout the prepa-
ration and execution of the environmental modification plan. Otherwise, if Al-
pha acted recklessly, the threat of trade sanctions would incentivize Alpha to 
comply with the Dispute Settlement Body’s ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
As there is no precedent for the issue of legal accountability for geoengi-
neered catastrophes, or for environmental modification techniques in general, 
policymakers must use various fields of international law to find standards to 
apply to geoengineering. As the only international treaty addressing environ-
mental modification techniques, ENMOD serves as the foundation for a geoen-
gineering treaty. The Montreal Protocol has demonstrated that the field of in-
ternational environmental governance is the most effective and applicable field 
of international law to provide a sufficient legal framework for geoengineering 
regarding enforcement. The TRIPS Agreement provides fundamental principles 
that should be adopted for a geoengineering treaty—particularly, the Dispute 
                                                        
198  See supra notes 139–40. 
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Settlement Body. NEPA provides the framework for regulation of environmen-
tal modification techniques through the use of Environmental Impact Assess-
ments. All together, ENMOD, the TRIPS Agreement, NEPA, and the Montreal 
Protocol contain valuable principles that can be applied to geoengineering and 
provide the basis for an international geoengineering treaty that would provide 
sufficient legal accountability in the event of a geoengineering catastrophe.  
